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Given the burden of injury, economic, environmental and social consequences associated with 
speeding, reducing road traffic speed remains a major priority.  Intelligent speed adaptation (ISA) is a 
promising but controversial new in-vehicle system that provides drivers with support on the speed-
control task.  In order to model potential system uptake, this paper explores drivers’ preferences for 
two different types of ISA given a number of alternative fiscal incentives and non-fiscal measures, 
using a stated preference approach.  As would be expected with such a contentious issue, the 
analysis revealed the presence of significant variations in sensitivities and preferences in the sample. 
While a non-negligible part of the sample population has such strong opposition to ISA that no 
reasonable discounts or incentives would lead to them buying or accepting such a system, there is 
also a large part of the population that, if given the right incentives, would be willing or even keen to 
equip their vehicle with an ISA device. 
Introduction 
Intelligent speed adaptation (ISA) is a system that provides information on the local speed limit to 
the driver, demonstrated to produce substantial savings in accidents and small reductions in fuel 
consumption and subsequent CO2 emissions (Carsten et al., 2008).  As such, this new technology 
offers one of the most promising strategies for combating the major economic, environmental, 
societal  and public health  impacts of road traffic speed.  Since the safety effects of ISA are directly 
dependent  on the  number of equipped vehicles on the road (Carsten et al., 2008) the benefits of 
ISA will not be realised without widespread adoption and use by members of the public and fleets.  
In the absence of fiscal incentives, the market penetration of ISA amongst private drivers will depend 
on the extent to which consumer buying behaviour relates to the benefits associated with ISA 
(increased safety, lower emissions).   But whilst these benefits are known to influence drivers’ 
purchasing decision, attributes such as price, styling and reliability remain drivers’ primary 
considerations when buying a new vehicle (see Koppel et al., 2005).  A recent survey of European 
drivers also noted that whilst drivers recognise some active safety systems as indispensible, those 
that monitor driving behaviour  are clearly rejected (European Commission, 2006).  In the case of 
ISA, this rejection is a likely consequence of private good characteristics of speed outweighing the 
public good characteristic of safety.  Given the positive beliefs associated with speeding, such as 
reduced journey time (Warner and Aberg, 2008), promoting ISA with less obvious private benefits 
presents a difficult problem.  Beyond this, the deployment of many Intelligent Vehicle Safety 
Systems (IVS), such as ISA, is often limited by the publics’ poor understanding, and lack of experience 
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with the technology.   Borrowing from cognitive psychology and advertising and marketing research, 
Zwijnenberg et al. (2007) therefore propose that the key to enhancing market penetration of any IVS 
lies in promotional activities and deployment initiatives.  Promotional activities such as 
demonstrations, campaigns and field operational tests serve to enhance consumers’ awareness and 
understanding of systems, whereas deployment initiatives are designed to increase a consumer’s 
willingness to buy.  Together, successful promotion and deployment activities should lead to 
increased sales of ISA equipped vehicles. 
To date, the U.K. has achieved considerable success in raising awareness amongst stakeholders 
through research, but little attention has been paid to deployment initiatives.  Zwijnenberg et al. 
(2007) report, however, that over half of drivers’ reasons for not buying an IVS system relate to 
willingness to buy (e.g. too expensive to buy/service, undermines freedom).  Thus whilst drivers 
state reasons related to willingness-to-buy for not purchasing IVS systems, stakeholders are 
engaging in very few activities to address this.  Since only a strategic approach, where activities are 
aimed at increasing awareness, understanding and willingness to buy, will guarantee accelerated 
market penetration, ensuring that the appropriate deployment initiatives are in place may be the 
key to encouraging take-up of ISA.  The research reported here explored this issue by examining 
drivers’ preferences for ISA given a number of alternative fiscal incentives, alongside non-fiscal 
measures, using a stated preference (SP) approach.  Two variants of ISA were examined; (1) 
mandatory ISA, a system which permanently limits the speed of the vehicle to the current speed 
limit and (2) voluntary ISA, a system which limits the speed of the vehicle to the speed limit but 
allows the driver to disengage the system. 
Incentivising purchase 
It is well known that financial considerations influence vehicle purchase and use decisions (e.g. 
Mohammadian & Miller, 2003). Financial encouragement to purchase ISA systems may be delivered 
by various means.  In Italy, the government provided 250 Euros (£213 approx) to encourage the 
purchase of motorcycles whose emissions complied with the EURO-2 standards (Carrotta, 2007).  
Insurance discounts provide an alternative means of providing a financial remuneration to the buyer.  
Lindberg et al. (2005) observed that the number of young drivers agreeing to the installation of a 
warning ISA system was influenced by the offer of an unconditional monthly insurance remuneration 
of SEK 150 (approx £12).  Reduced taxation schemes have also been shown to increase sales of 
safety systems (Bansgaard, 2007) and environmentally friendly vehicles (Carrotta, 2007).  We have in 
our SP experiments explored each of these mechanisms since we accept that each is likely to vary in 
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popularity and influence.  The impact of an insurance incentive, for example, may have little effect 
on mid to highly experienced drivers who already enjoy significant bonuses.  This  incentive is liable 
to have its largest effect on younger new vehicle purchasers who are more likely to identify 
insurance as an important cost (DfT, 2004).  Consequently, an important part of the current research 
was to explore not only the magnitude of discount required to encourage ISA take-up but also the 
most influential means of delivering that discount. 
This paper focuses solely on the relative preference between the two systems as well as the stated 
intention to buy a given system and does not look at the extent of use for the voluntary system.  
From this perspective, one-off installation costs or incentives are likely to play the largest role in the 
behaviour observed in our survey. However, it should be recognised that incentives to use an ISA 
system (i.e. marginal benefits), where the system is voluntary and has to be activated by the driver, 
will also affect the relative preferences as well as stated purchase intentions, and as such these 
incentives will also need to be incorporated in our models. Here, we considered two variants in 
order to determine the most influential mechanism, namely fuel rebates or cash back on a driver’s 
insurance premium if they used the system for a certain proportion of their driving.   
Beyond this, four non-fiscal features were considered that might potentially influence an individual’s 
propensity to purchase an ISA equipped vehicle.  Changes in policy can be expected to play an 
important role in accelerating market penetration of ISA.  Broughton (2008) noted that drivers 
changed their behaviour according to the number of speeding convictions they have accrued where 
these would increase the risk of disqualification from driving under the U.K. penalty point system.  
Given that the threat of disqualification has been shown to change behaviour, we predicted that an 
increase in the fixed penalty points for speeding or the length of time for which points remain on a 
driver’s license may create demand for speed limiting technologies.   As the safety benefits 
associated with ISA increase in line with the number of other ISA equipped vehicles on the road (at 
least to a certain threshold), we also hypothesised that the penetration rate of ISA would influence 
drivers’ tendency to purchase an ISA vehicle.  Finally, since drivers show little willingness to pay extra 
for intrusive safety features, combining ISA with attractive ‘add on’ packages (such as entertainment 
packages) was also considered.   Emphasizing the saving made on the purchase of these combined 






The SP survey involved presenting drivers with a set of hypothetical scenarios, each time involving a 
vehicle fitted with a mandatory ISA system (i.e. a system which permanently limits the speed of the 
vehicle to speed limit) or a vehicle fitted with an voluntary ISA system (i.e. a system which limits the 
speed of the vehicle to the speed limit but allows the driver to disengage the system). These two 
options were described using a range of attributes that are discussed below. 
Our a priori assumption, which was confirmed by focus groups and piloting, was that there would be 
considerable heterogeneity of preferences towards safety and speed related devices in the 
population. On this basis, separate survey designs were created for three types of vehicle purchaser: 
Group 1: Those who would buy a mandatory ISA system — these drivers received an SP survey 
where both systems were offered at a cost to the driver (490 respondents).  
Group 2: Those who would only buy a voluntary system — here drivers were required to pay for a 
voluntary system but received incentives to acquire a mandatory system (503 respondents).  
Group 3: Those who like neither system — both systems were offered with discounts and incentives 
to encourage drivers to purchase an ISA vehicle (466 respondents).  
The segmentation of respondents into these three groups was based on an initial screening question 
which determined a preference for ISA in the absence of incentives.  Anyone willing to buy a 
mandatory ISA equipped vehicle was assigned to group 1, those only willing to buy a voluntary 
equipped ISA vehicle were assigned to group 2, whilst those showing no willingness to buy either 
system formed group 3.    The question used to inform allocation into groups was not accompanied 
by any information on costs and discounts. Nevertheless, the allocation of respondents into these 
initial groups provided an early indication that 64% of the sample was willing, in principle, to 
consider purchasing an ISA-equipped vehicle. 
Core attributes 
The SP design included two core attributes.  These  core attributes reflected purchase 
incentives/costs and incentives to use a voluntary ISA system, as discussed above.   
In Group 1, respondents had to pay for both systems, with the price for the system being a function 
of the average amount respondents would spend on their next vehicle, using a range between 0% 
and 9% for the mandatory system and between 4% and 9% for the voluntary system (5 levels).   To 
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ensure that in the majority of cases the mandatory ISA system represented the ‘best’ deal when 
comparing the incentives to buy and use, the minimum and maximum value of the amount spent on 
the next vehicle used in the calculations was capped at £5,000 and £15,000.  Additionally, 
respondents were given an incentive to use the voluntary system, ranging from no incentive to 2 
pence per mile up to a maximum of 20,000 miles1 (4 levels).     
In Group 2, which contained respondents who expressed a preference for the voluntary system, a 
discount on vehicle price was offered in return for choosing the mandatory system (ranging from 5% 
to 50% of vehicle price), while the respondents still had to pay for the voluntary system (ranging 
from 0.5% to 8% of the vehicle price)(5 levels).  Again the price offered was a function of the amount 
respondents were willing to spend on their next vehicle (with cut off points of £5,000 and £15,000). 
The same incentives to use the voluntary system were again offered. 
In Group 3, which contained respondents who expressed a dislike for both systems, two approaches 
were used. In the first approach, discounts on vehicle price were offered in return for choosing 
either system, ranging from 15% to 40% for the mandatory system, and from 0% to 20% for the 
voluntary system (5 levels). In the second approach, these discounts were replaced by tax rebates, 
ranging from £750 to £950 for the mandatory system and from £0 to £200 for the voluntary system. 
Finally, incentives to use the voluntary system were again offered, but these have now increased, 
with a range between 1 penny per mile to 2.5 pence per mile ( 4 levels with an upper limit of 20,000 
miles). 
Additional attributes 
While the core attributes were included with a view to testing for the relative preference for either 
system, the additional attributes were included with a view to influencing the overall attractiveness 
of ISA systems. For this reason, the four additional attributes included here were common to both 
ISA systems and groups.  These comprise:  
1. Penetration rate: percentage of other vehicles equipped with the speed limiter system on U.K. 
roads (5 levels: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%);  
                                                          
1
 An upper limit of 20,000 miles was set so as not to create a reward system which encouraged drivers 
to increase their annual mileage for financial gain. 
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2. Free add-ons: packages offered with a speed limiter equipped vehicle at no extra cost to driver (4 
levels: free safety add on (e.g. additional airbags); free entertainment add-on (e.g. in-car dvd player); 
free styling add-on (e.g. leather seats); no free add-on);  
3. Penalty points: penalty administered for committing a speeding offence (2 levels: 3 points; 6 
points) and  
4. Endorsement period: the length of time speeding endorsements remain on a driver’s licence (3 
levels: remain on license for 3 years; remain on license for 4 years; remain on license for 5 years).   
SP design 
In order to limit the information presented within each scenario, each respondent was presented 
with four attributes.  All were presented with the two core attributes and two extra attributes 
(either “penalty points” and “penetration rate” or “free add-ons” and “endorsement period”).  The 
attributes were combined depending on purchaser group to create 16 SP surveys, each making use 
of 12 separate scenarios.  An overview of the survey design is presented in Table 1. 
[insert table 1 here] 
The field of SP experimental design has evolved significantly over recent years, with growing interest 
in efficient designs (cf. Rose & Bliemer, 2008). However, efficient designs require a priori information 
on the likely values of the coefficients for the model to be estimated on the data resulting from the 
survey. With the innovative nature of the study presented here, such prior information was not 
available, and we consequently relied on the use of an orthogonal design.   
An example of a typical choice scenario for a group 3 respondent is present in Figure 1. Respondents 
were also provided with a show card detailing the definitions of each attribute. 
[insert figure 1 here] 
Stated choice and stated intention 
In each SP scenario, two separate pieces of information were collected from a respondent. We first 
collected information on which of the two ISA equipped vehicles a driver would prefer under given 
scenarios. This stated choice or stated preference information provided the majority of the input for 
the modelling analysis. This however equates to a forced choice, and while it allows us to gauge the 
relative preference, it does not provide us with any information on actual or absolute preferences. 
For this reason, in each scenario respondents were also asked which vehicle, if any, they would 
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consider buying. In this stated purchase intention, respondents also had the option of indicating that 
they would, in principle, be willing to buy either vehicle, or neither vehicle. 
Participants 
The survey was administered using Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) to allow 
customisation of the SP scenarios to each individual’s responses and random presentation of the SP 
designs.  Interviews were conducted with 1,487 drivers at their homes (1,459 of the interviews were 
used in the analysis). The interviews were carried out across Great Britain in randomly selected 
census output areas across 11 regions and at addresses randomly selected within each area. The 
number of interviews conducted in each region was proportionate to the population.  Only one 
driver was interviewed per household.   
Modelling methodology 
Mathematical structures belonging to the family of Random Utility Models (RUM) were used in the 
analysis of both the stated choice (SC) and stated intention (SI) components of the SP data. We 
specifically make use of discrete choice models that are used to analyse one choice at a time (see 
Train, 2003). These models can be used directly for the choice between the two systems, while for 
the SI data, the choice was formulated as being between the decision to buy and the decision not to 
buy. This leads to three different model structures, one choice model for the SC data, and two 
models for the decision to buy the mandatory and voluntary systems respectively. 
In a discrete choice model, a respondent is faced with a choice between a finite set of mutually 
exclusive options, referred to as alternatives. Each alternative in this choice set is characterised by a 
number of attributes, e.g. price and cost of use. The underlying reasoning is that each alternative has 
an associated utility, where this is a function of the attributes of the alternatives and the associated 
sensitivities of a respondent, possibly interacting with socio-demographic characteristics of the 
respondent. The aim of a choice modelling analysis is to provide estimates of the sensitivities of 
respondents to changes in the attributes of the alternatives.  
A rational decision maker is expected to choose the alternative with the highest utility (or lowest 
disutility). With the utility of an alternative not being observed by the analyst, we move to a random 
utility framework in which the probability of choosing an alternative increases with the modelled 
utility for that alternative. In the present analysis, we relied on two different model structures. The 
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base model in each case was a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model in which the sensitivities (and hence 
preferences) are kept constant across all respondents in the sample. While the MNL model remains 
the starting (and reference) point of almost all discrete choice studies, the assumption of taste 
homogeneity (other than in terms of interactions and segmentations) is not generally justified, 
especially in the context of a topic as divisive as the one at the heart of this paper. 
To move away from the restrictive homogeneity assumption, we also estimated Latent Class (LC) 
choice models (see e.g. Greene & Hensher, 2003). In these models, the sample population is divided 
into different classes with variations in sensitivities across classes. In the absence of information on 
which class a specific respondent belongs to, a class allocation model is used that allocates a 
respondent into a specific class with a certain probability, where this probability is a function of 
socio-demographic attributes of the respondent. A LC model could thus for example lead to two 
classes with different cost sensitivities, and respondents with higher income might have a higher 
probability of falling into the low cost sensitivity class2. LC models are not used as widely in 
transportation as their continuous Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) counterparts, yet posses a 
number of crucial advantages not just in terms of linking sensitivities to socio-demographics but also 
in terms of breaking free from restrictive a priori shape assumptions in the specification of this 
heterogeneity (cf. Hess et al, 2009). In the present paper, an exploratory (rather than confirmatory) 
approach was used, such that the classes were retrieved during model estimation, rather than being 
imposed during model specification. 
Results 
The results from the modelling analysis are presented in two parts. We first look at the models 
estimated on the stated choice between the two ISA options before turning to the models estimated 
on the stated purchase intention data. 
Choice between different ISA options 
This section presents the models estimated on the stated choice information, i.e. respondents’ 
preferences between the two systems in given settings. For each of the three segments, we first 
estimated MNL models before turning our attention to the LC models. Here, it quickly became clear 
that the level of heterogeneity in the data was so pronounced that MNL models were not 
                                                          
2
 Another crucial advantage of this model in the present context is that it can recognise the repeated 
choice nature of the data, i.e. the fact that each respondent is faced with multiple choice tasks.  
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appropriate, with the LC models obtaining far superior fit and more reasonable results. For the sake 
of brevity, we limit our presentation here to the findings from the more advanced LC models 3. These 
models only include the incentive to buy (either cost or discount) as well as the incentive to use 
(voluntary only) as attributes4. The remaining attributes (i.e. the extras) were common to the two 
systems and were not observed to have a differential effect on the probability of choosing either 
system so they were not included in these models. 
Group 1 
The final sample from the SC survey in group 1 contains 5,695 responses from 490 respondents. In 
the specification search, we gradually increased the number of classes in the model, where the 
model with a single class corresponds to the MNL structure. As expected, each additional class leads 
to increases in model fit, where these are especially dramatic early on (e.g. when moving from MNL5 
to a LC model with two classes), but the improvements obtained beyond four classes were not 
statistically significant. 
In each class, five parameters explaining the choices were estimated, namely a constant for the 
mandatory system, system specific cost coefficients (associated with purchase price), and 
coefficients associated with fuel rebates and insurance cash backs offered as an incentive to use the 
voluntary system. The marginal utility coefficients give the change in utility resulting from an 
increase by one unit in the associated attribute, with any constant giving a baseline value for that 
alternative’s utility.  
In the class allocation model, a class-specific constant was estimated, along with parameters 
associated with five different socio-demographic attributes. In each case, a summation to zero 
constraint was used across classes for the sake of normalisation. The five socio-demographic 
attributes used were sex, age, income, driving experience and annual mileage. We also made 
attempts to include various other socio-demographic attributes in the class-allocation models, 
relating to employment status, occupation, penalty points on a respondent’s license, value of the 
vehicle, marital status and current fuel, insurance and road tax costs. None of these additional terms 
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 MNL models are available from the second author on request. 
4
 In the final specification, the actual per mile discount was used in the utility functions as this was 
found to lead to more robust results than using the respondent-specific discount as a function of miles driven. 
5
 As a comparison with the model from Table 2, the log-likelihood for the MNL model was -2,617.77, 
with 5 estimated parameters, giving an adjusted ρ
2
 measure of 0.34 
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had any consistent effects such that they were dropped from the models. Finally, for multi-level 
attributes (e.g. different age groups), summation to zero constraints were used to allow model 
identification. 
The estimation results for the model with four classes are summarised in Table 2. Looking first at the 
class specific choice models, we can see that the four marginal utility coefficients6 are of the 
expected sign and statistically significant in classes one, two and three. However, in the fourth class, 
there are issues with significance for all four coefficients, along with a sign issue for the coefficient 
associated with the fuel rebates. This class is characterised by a large negative constant for the 
mandatory system, while this constant was positive in the remaining three classes. These results 
would suggest that this fourth class captures respondents who have a strong opposition to the 
mandatory system, independently of the attributes of either system. This is an interesting 
observation in its own right. The subclass of population used for this model were respondents who 
had previously indicated an interest in the mandatory system. The results would thus suggest that 
the scenarios presented in the SP did not correspond with the a priori expectations of these 
respondents. 
Turning our attention next to the class allocation model, we observe that apart from the constant 
and the experience parameters, the estimates are not significantly different across classes on the 
basis of the Wald test. Additionally, and again apart from the constants, few of the estimates in the 
class allocation model are significantly different from zero. This would suggest that while there are 
some significant differences in sensitivities (and hence behaviour) in the sample population (looking 
at the choice model rather than the class allocation model), these cannot be explained on the basis 
of the socio-demographic information.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In terms of actual differences, the model identifies two classes with a strong preference for the 
mandatory system (class 1 and especially class 2), a third class with relatively even probabilities 
across the presented choices, and the above mentioned fourth class with the strong preference for 
the voluntary system. The first two classes and to some extent also the third class get much higher 
weight, resulting in the sample market shares of 76.5% and 23.5% for the two systems. Here, it is 
interesting to note that male respondents are less likely to fall into the class with a strong preference 
for the mandatory system (class 1). 
                                                          
6
 Cost of mandatory system (£), Cost of voluntary system (£), Fuel rebate for voluntary system 
(pence/mile), Insurance cash back for voluntary system (pence/mile) 
 1
2 
On the basis of the estimation results, it is straightforward to work out a point at which the 
mandatory system and the voluntary system have equal probability of being chosen. We undertake 
this calculation on the basis of a price of £600 for the voluntary system along with a 1p per mile fuel 
rebate. Here, we can see that this equilibrium would be achieved with a price of £423 in the first 
class. In the second class, which is characterised by a high preference for the mandatory system 
along with low cost sensitivity, the mandatory system could cost £1,296 to get the same probability 
as the voluntary system with £600 and a 1 penny fuel rebate. In the third class, which shows much 
more even preferences, the mandatory system would again have to be cheaper than the voluntary 
system, at £323, while in the fourth class, even a free mandatory system would have a lower 
probability than the voluntary system, even at prices higher than £600. This comparison illustrates 
the major differences between different respondents in their attitudes towards the two systems. 
Group 2 
The final sample for the second group contains 5,836 responses collected from 503 individuals. In 
the second group of SP surveys, respondents obtained a discount for choosing the mandatory 
system while still paying to buy the voluntary system. The models thus still make use of five main 
parameters, but the cost coefficient for the mandatory system is replaced by a discount coefficient, 
where we would expect positive estimates. 
In the specification search for the second group, we observed comparatively very poor fit for the 
MNL model (giving an adjusted ρ2 measure of 0.06), suggesting that the extent of heterogeneity is so 
high that no reliable results can be obtained with a model making a taste homogeneity assumption. 
Significant improvements were obtained with the LC structures, where once again we settled on a 
structure using four classes. 
The estimation results for the model with four classes are summarised in Table 3. Looking first at the 
class specific choice models, we can see that the four marginal utility coefficients are of the expected 
sign and statistically significant in classes one and four. In the second class, the coefficient associated 
with fuel rebates is negative, but not significantly different from zero, while in the third class, the 
cost coefficient for the voluntary alternative is positive, but again not significantly different from 
zero. There are differences across classes in the relative sensitivities to fuel rebates and insurance 
cash backs. Additionally, in three classes, respondents react more positively to discounts in the cost 
of the mandatory system than they do negatively to increases in the cost of the voluntary system, 
although these differences are small. 
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The constant for the mandatory alternative is negative and significant in the second and fourth class, 
while it is positive in the second class. On the basis of the Wald test, the results also show us that all 
estimates, and especially the constant for the mandatory alternative, vary significantly across 
classes, highlighting the presence of significant differences in sensitivities within this sample. 
Turning our attention next to the class allocation model, we observe that the constant, the age and 
the experience parameters vary significantly across classes on the basis of the Wald test. Again, like 
in group 1, few of the estimates in the class allocation model are significantly different from zero. 
This would again suggest that while there are some significant differences in sensitivities (and hence 
behaviour) in the sample population, these cannot easily be explained on the basis of the socio-
demographic information.  
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
In terms of actual differences, the model identifies a single class with a very strong preference for 
the mandatory system (class 1), where the models show that male respondents are less likely to fall 
into this class. The second class shows a strong preference for the voluntary system, with 
respondents aged over sixty being more likely to fall into this class. The remaining two classes show 
a slight preference for the mandatory system, but differ significantly for example in terms of the 
higher sensitivity to incentives to use in the third class. The first two classes, i.e. those with more 
extreme preferences for one of the two systems, get a higher weight, again highlighting the strong 
differences in attitudes in the population. 
As a comparison with the models from group 1, we again look at points at which the two systems 
would have equal probability of being chosen. Here, we can calculate that, in the first class, a 
discount for the mandatory system is only required if the voluntary system is sold at less than £530 
with a 1 penny per mile fuel discount. In the second class, the dislike of the mandatory system is so 
extreme that any realistic levels for the discount would not be sufficient for the mandatory system 
to be as likely to be chosen as the voluntary system. In the third class, this calculation is not possible 
due to the insignificant cost coefficient for the voluntary system, while in the fourth class, we see 
that, with a cost of the voluntary system at £600, a discount of £1,450 on the mandatory system is 
needed to obtain equal probabilities for the two systems. As in the group 1 models, this comparison 





The final sample for the third group contains 5,412 observations collected from 466 respondents. 
Some differences in the model specification arise in that discounts are now offered for both systems, 
with two types of discount depending on the specific survey, either in terms of a reduced price or a 
discount on vehicle tax. This leads to seven parameters in each class in the choice model. 
Just as in group 2, the MNL model again produced comparatively very poor performance (with an 
adjusted ρ2 measure of 0.07), with dramatic improvements when moving to the LC models, where 
the recommended model in this group makes use of three classes. 
The estimation results for the model with three classes are summarised in Table 4. Looking first at 
the class specific choice models, we can see that the six marginal utility coefficients are of the 
expected sign (positive) in all three classes. However, there are some problems with parameter 
significance in class 1, which suggests that in this class, the large negative constant dominates, along 
with the discount on the mandatory system.  On the basis of the Wald test, the results also show us 
that all estimates with the exception of the sensitivity to the tax discount for the voluntary system 
vary significantly across classes. 
Turning our attention next to the class allocation model, we observe that only the effect of age 
varies significantly across classes. Here, we note that younger respondents are less likely to fall into 
the first two classes with older respondents less likely to fall into the third class. This suggests that 
younger respondents have less extreme preferences for the two systems (class 3 has a more even 
distribution of sensitivities).  
In terms of actual differences, the model identifies one class with a strong preference for the 
mandatory system (class 1), one class with a strong preference for the voluntary system (class 2), 
and a final class (class 3) with relatively even probabilities across the presented choices. The 
preferences in the first class are so extreme that no reasonable shift in discounts will lead to equal 
probabilities for the two systems. In the second class, the preference for the mandatory system is so 
large that with no discount for that system, a discount of £769 for the voluntary system along with a 
1 penny per mile fuel discount is required to obtain equal probabilities. Finally, in the third class, 
with no discount on the voluntary system but a 1 penny per mile fuel discount, a discount of £2,040 
is required for the mandatory system to obtain equal probabilities of choice for the two systems. 





We next turn our attention to models estimated on respondents’ stated intention to buy or not buy 
an ISA system. As a reminder, respondents were asked to indicate in each scenario, and for each 
system, whether they would be prepared to purchase that system. Here, separate models were 
estimated for the two systems, with the two alternatives being to buy or not to buy the system in 
question. However, it was recognised that the attributes of one system potentially had an effect on 
the stated intention to buy the other system given that the two systems were presented alongside 
one another. On the basis of this, the attributes of both systems were included in both sets of 
models (with separate coefficients). The utility of the second alternative (not buy) was set to zero. A 
constant was included in the buy alternative, along with the attributes of the two systems as already 
discussed in the context of the stated choice models. The expectation here is that e.g. increases the 
cost attribute for a given system have a negative effect on the utility of buying that system, while 
they have a positive impact on the utility of buying the alternative system. Efforts were also made to 
test for the effects of extra attributes, such as the free add-ons, but these were only found to have 
an effect in one model, namely that for buying the mandatory system in the third group. 
Here, we present a comparatively brief overview of these models, with less detail than for the stated 
choice models. In particular, we limit ourselves to the presentation of MNL results. Indeed, while the 
estimation of LC results again showed the presence of significant variations in sensitivities in the 
sample population, the improvements over the MNL models were far less dramatic than in the 
models estimated on stated choice questions. Additionally, the overall findings from the MNL 
models were robust and consistent with those from the LC models. 
Table 5 summarises the results of the MNL models estimated on the buy/not buy data. We first turn 
our attention to the group 1 models. The results are very much as expected. Increases in cost have a 
decreasing effect on the probability of buying a specific system, but have an increasing effect on the 
probability of buying the alternative system. Here, the cost of the mandatory system plays a much 
bigger role than does the cost of the voluntary system.  Fuel rebates and insurance cash backs as an 
incentive of using the voluntary system have a positive impact on the probability of buying the 
voluntary system but have the opposite effect on the probability of buying the mandatory system. 
On the basis of these estimation results, we can work out that, if the voluntary system was free with 
a fuel rebate of 1p/mile, the mandatory system could cost up to £273 before the probability of 
buying it would drop below 50%. However, with costs of the voluntary system at £600 and £1,200, 
the maximum price (before the probability drops below 50%) for the mandatory system is below 
that of the voluntary system, at £541 and £810 respectively. This is a result of the asymmetry in the 
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sensitivity to costs for the two systems. Looking at the probability of buying the voluntary system, 
again at no cost and with a fuel rebate of 1p/mile, the mandatory system would have to cost more 
than £775 before the probability of buying the voluntary system exceeds 50%. At costs of the 
voluntary system at £600 and £1,200, the minimum price for the mandatory system is at £987 and 
£1199 respectively. This means that up to a price of £1,200, the cost of the voluntary system needs 
to be below that of the mandatory system for the probability of buying it to exceed 50%. 
Looking next at group 2, all parameters again have the expected sign, with increases in the discount 
for the mandatory system or the cost of the voluntary system having positive impacts on the 
probability of buying the mandatory system, and negative impacts on the probability of buying the 
voluntary system. Here, we can also calculate that, if the voluntary system was free with a fuel 
rebate of 1p/mile, the mandatory system would have to come with a discount of at least £2,818 
before the probability of buying the mandatory system would drop below 50%. This drops to £1,788 
and £757 when the cost of the voluntary system is increased to £600 and £1,200 respectively. On 
the other hand, looking at the probability of buying the voluntary system, again at no cost and with a 
fuel rebate of 1p/mile, the mandatory system would have to come with a discount of less than £140, 
above which the probability of buying the voluntary system drops below 50%. With higher costs for 
the voluntary system, the probability is less than 50% even without discounts for the mandatory 
system. At higher rates of fuel rebates, these values change significantly. 
Looking finally at the models for group 3, the overall results are consistent with intuition, but there 
are several problems with parameter robustness. In this group, the probability to buy either system 
is very low (as expected), and consequently, the models are strongly dominated by the constant. The 
calculations of trade-offs are hampered by the insignificant parameters. However, we can see that, 
with no discount for the voluntary system and no fuel rebate, a discount of £7,936 would be 
required to have a probability of 50% or more for the mandatory system to be bought. When adding 
a free entertainment system, this drops to £5,566. This drop is higher than expected, and gives an 
indication of the high protest vote associated with the mandatory system. For the voluntary system, 
a discount of £2,838 would be required for the probability of buying the system to exceed 50%, 
where fuel rebates and insurance cash backs seemingly have no statistically significant effects. 
[insert Table 5 here] 
Discussion 
This paper has discussed the estimation of discrete choice model structures on data from a stated 
preference survey looking at the potential demand for ISA. The analysis made use of two 
 1
7 
approaches, looking at respondents’ stated choice between the two systems in various settings, as 
well as their stated buying intentions in these settings. The analysis has shown that for the latter, 
respondents still compare the two systems, i.e. they do not evaluate the mandatory and voluntary 
system independently. Nevertheless, especially in group 3, these models may be seen as more useful 
than the choice models as they avoid the issue of forcing upon respondents a choice between two 
systems neither of which they may like. 
As would be expected with such a contentious issue, the analysis has revealed the presence of 
significant variations in sensitivities and preferences in the sample. The main differences arise 
between the three groups already identified prior to the administration of the survey questionnaire. 
However, further differences arise also within these groups, in the form of significant variations in 
the acceptable costs (for respondents willing to pay for ISA) respectably the required discounts (for 
respondents requiring incentives to have ISA installed in their vehicles) . Here, the degree of 
heterogeneity is so high that models making an assumption of homogeneity in tastes are unable to 
offer an acceptable fit to the data. Significant improvements in performance are in turn obtained by 
making use of models that break free from this homogeneity assumption. 
The other observation that comes out of the analysis is that, while there are very significant 
variations in sensitivities and preferences, these cannot easily be linked to socio-demographic 
attributes of the respondents. As such, it is not necessarily the case that young male respondents 
have a strong objection to ISAs while older respondents with more expensive vehicles have a more 
positive attitude. This observation would suggest that people have strong inherent views on 
installing an ISA in their vehicle, where these are independent of their socio-demographic 
characteristics, and that, as a consequence, it is not easy to target one specific part of the population 
in a campaign to increase the uptake of such systems. 
The range of retrieved valuations is extreme. While discounts of up to £8,000 may be required in 
group 3 to obtain a probability of 50% of buying a mandatory ISA, respondents in group 1 are willing 
to pay several hundred pounds for a mandatory system. Similarly extreme valuations arise in the 
preference models where respondents are asked to choose between the two systems. To some 
degree, the actual valuations discussed in this section are specific to the data at hand and are 
dependent on the scenarios put to respondents. However, what is clear is that there are strong 
underlying attitudes to ISA systems, where these attitudes are quite hostile especially in the third 
group. A non-negligible part of the sample population have such strong opposition especially to the 
mandatory system that no reasonable discounts or incentives would lead to them buying or 
accepting such a system. Finally, the analysis has similarly shown that there is a large part of the 
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population that, if given the right incentives (whether in terms of lower cost or higher discounts), 
would be willing or even keen to equip their vehicle with an ISA device. To some extent, these 
results are clearly affected by strategic voting by some individuals, and a more moderate response 
may arise in a real life setting. Nevertheless, this paper presents useful initial insights into the 
potential uptake of ISA. 
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Form of SP Survey Cost of ISA 





would buy a 
mandatory ISA 
system 
Survey where both 
systems were 
offered at a cost to 
the driver 
Price of system ranges 
from 0% to 9% of vehicle 
price for the mandatory 
system, and from 4% to 
9% for the voluntary 
system 
Ranged from 0p 
to 2p per mile (up 
to 20,000 miles). 
Incentive could 






would buy a 
voluntary ISA 
system 
Requirement to pay 
for voluntary 
system but 
incentives to buy a 
mandatory system 
Discount on vehicle price 
offered in return for 
choosing the mandatory 
system (ranging from 5% 
to 50% of vehicle price). 
 
Respondents had to pay 
for voluntary system 
(ranging from 0.5% to 8% 










Two approaches tested:  
(1) discounts on vehicle 
price offered in return for 
choosing either system, 
ranging from 15% to 40% 
for the mandatory 
system, and from 0% to 
20% for the voluntary 
system; (2) these 
discounts were replaced 
by tax rebates, ranging 
from £750 to £950 for the 
mandatory system and 
from £0 to £200 for the 
voluntary system 
Ranged from 1p 
per mile to 2.5p 






Table 2: Estimation results for LC choice model with 4 classes for group 1 
Number of respondents: 490          
Number of observations: 5695          
Number of parameters: 50          
Log-likelihood (LL): -1,922.59          
adj. Ρ
2
: 0.5003          
           









average class size 35.79% 34.39% 23.72% 6.11% 
av.prob. for mandatory 80.31% 95.48% 57.11% 16.27% 76.49% 
av.prob. for voluntary 19.69% 4.52% 42.89% 83.73% 23.51% 
           











Choice model parameters est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. p-value 
Constant for mandatory system 3.6857 5.97 4.1782 9.76 0.6538 2.93 -2.2420 -3.03 201.62 0.00 
Cost of mandatory system (£) -0.0132 -10.05 -0.0035 -7.93 -0.0025 -7.01 -0.0009 -1.31 200.65 0.00 
Cost of voluntary system (£) -0.0047 -3.78 -0.0015 -2.17 -0.0019 -5.76 -0.0010 -1.87 53.89 0.00 
Fuel rebate for voluntary system (pence/mile) 0.9264 3.99 0.5428 2.37 0.9865 8.26 -0.2713 -0.70 96.16 0.00 
Insurance cash back for voluntary system (pence/mile) 1.0341 3.69 0.4731 2.28 0.8820 7.60 0.0098 0.02 85.30 0.00 
           











Class allocation model parameters est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. p-value 
Class specific constant 0.9490 3.86 0.6113 2.65 -0.3688 -1.34 -1.1915 -3.09 22.33 0.00 
Dummy for male respondents -0.4234 -2.07 0.0269 0.14 0.1404 0.59 0.2561 0.73 4.45 0.22 
Aged under 24 years -0.0750 -0.21 -0.4099 -1.15 0.4275 0.94 0.0574 0.08 
12.11 0.21 Aged between 24 and 40 years 0.2481 1.13 0.1339 0.61 0.3512 1.45 -0.7332 -1.50 
Aged between 40 and 60 years -0.1745 -0.93 -0.0373 -0.20 -0.3820 -1.68 0.5938 1.85 
Aged over 60 years 0.0014 0.01 0.3133 1.48 -0.3967 -1.64 0.0820 0.21 
Income less than £15,000 0.2259 1.20 0.2273 1.21 -0.2498 -0.96 -0.2034 -0.64 
7.53 0.27 Income between £15,000 and £45,000 -0.1649 -1.10 0.0587 0.38 0.3232 1.63 -0.2170 -0.88 
Income above £45,000 -0.0610 -0.25 -0.2860 -1.15 -0.0734 -0.22 0.4204 1.20 
Less than 5 years driving experience 0.4806 1.61 0.2670 0.92 -0.4621 -1.05 -0.2855 -0.40 
11.79 0.07 Between 5 and 10 years driving experience -0.6236 -2.35 -0.0490 -0.22 0.0100 0.03 0.6625 1.49 
Over 10 years driving experience 0.1430 0.65 -0.2180 -1.06 0.4521 1.61 -0.3770 -0.90 








Table 3: Estimation results for LC choice model with 4 classes for group 2 
Number of respondents: 503          
Number of observations: 5,836          
Number of parameters: 50          
Log-likelihood (LL): -2,315.00          
adj. Ρ
2
: 0.4154          
           

















av.prob. for mandatory 0.9244 
 
0.0343 0.6243 0.5953 0.5446 
av.prob. for voluntary 0.0756 
 
0.9657 0.3757 0.4047 0.4554 
           











Choice model parameters est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. p-value 
Constant for mandatory system -0.1816 -0.59 -4.4210 -11.19 1.0080 4.46 -2.0170 -5.30 215.80 0.00 
Discount for mandatory system (£) 0.0025 6.70 0.0001 1.32 0.0002 3.74 0.0011 7.86 105.38 0.00 
Cost of voluntary system (£) -0.0017 -2.96 -0.0021 -4.64 0.0000 0.15 -0.0009 -2.25 36.00 0.00 
Fuel rebate for voluntary system (pence/mile) 0.7188 3.99 -0.0870 -0.39 1.1040 8.29 0.1180 0.71 84.30 0.00 
Insurance cash back for voluntary system 
(pence/mile) 
0.7794 4.43 0.3684 1.36 0.9395 7.65 0.6569 3.68 117.70 0.00 
           











Class allocation model parameters est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. p-value 
Class specific constant 0.4547 1.88 0.4374 1.96 -0.8631 -1.92 -0.0291 -0.10 7.0921 0.07 
Dummy for male respondents -0.3571 -2.16 -0.0207 -0.12 0.1774 0.77 0.2004 0.79 4.9705 0.17 
Aged under 24 years -0.2928 -0.75 -0.2296 -0.65 1.2810 1.93 -0.7591 -1.54 
24.7659 0.00 Aged between 24 and 40 years 0.2659 1.53 -0.3859 -2.28 0.2466 0.87 -0.1266 -0.52 
Aged between 40 and 60 years -0.0997 -0.53 -0.2002 -1.12 -0.0063 -0.02 0.3062 1.14 
Aged over 60 years 0.1265 0.48 0.8158 3.45 -1.5220 -3.17 0.5795 1.55 
Income less than £15,000 0.0329 0.13 0.0680 0.27 -0.3953 -0.81 0.2944 0.89 
2.8559 0.83 Income between £15,000 and £45,000 -0.1805 -1.14 -0.0575 -0.37 0.3308 1.20 -0.0928 -0.43 
Income above £45,000 0.1476 0.72 -0.0105 -0.05 0.0645 0.19 -0.2016 -0.72 
Less than 5 years driving experience 0.4387 1.33 0.1642 0.53 -1.3640 -2.16 0.7612 2.10 
14.0439 0.03 Between 5 and 10 years driving experience -0.5371 -1.97 0.1065 0.50 0.3068 0.76 0.1238 0.45 
Over 10 years driving experience 0.0983 0.44 -0.2707 -1.21 1.0570 2.77 -0.8850 -2.88 





Table 4: Estimation results for LC choice model with 3 classes for group 3 
Number of respondents: 466        
Number of observations: 5,412        
Number of parameters: 41        
Log-likelihood (LL): -1,839.50 
 





       
         







average class size 0.4965 0.2843 0.2192 
av.prob. for mandatory 0.0161 0.8923 0.4021 0.3485 
av.prob. for voluntary 0.9839 0.1077 0.5979 0.6515 
         









Choice model parameters est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. p-value 
Constant for mandatory system -4.8440 -6.71 1.6110 4.21 -0.6025 -1.85 69.99 0.00 
Discount for mandatory system, price (£) 0.0005 3.80 0.0012 5.50 0.0004 4.32 55.27 0.00 
Discount for mandatory system, tax (£) 0.0004 0.48 0.0021 4.93 0.0008 2.17 27.46 0.00 
Discount for voluntary system, price (£) 0.0001 0.29 0.0016 7.21 0.0009 5.10 76.55 0.00 
Discount for voluntary system, tax (£) 0.0009 0.22 0.0028 1.72 0.0016 1.42 5.33 0.15 
Fuel rebate for voluntary system (pence/mile) 0.2919 0.82 0.3812 2.06 0.2136 1.73 7.29 0.06 
Insurance cash back for voluntary system 
(pence/mile) 
0.0158 0.05 0.5141 3.02 0.1960 1.41 12.90 0.00 
         









Class allocation model parameters est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. p-value 
Class specific constant 0.3361 1.97 -0.0692 -0.35 -0.2669 -1.21 3.93 0.14 
Dummy for male respondents -0.1089 -0.78 -0.2872 -1.82 0.3962 2.09 4.65 0.10 
Aged under 24 years -0.5083 -1.97 -0.1915 -0.65 0.6997 2.40 
12.07 0.06 Aged between 24 and 40 years 0.1265 1.00 -0.2429 -1.64 0.1164 0.76 
Aged between 40 and 60 years 0.1436 1.09 0.0354 0.24 -0.1790 -1.07 
Aged over 60 years 0.2382 1.40 0.3990 2.11 -0.6372 -2.78 
Income less than £15,000 -0.0576 -0.41 -0.0524 -0.33 0.1100 0.63 
1.42 0.84 Income between £15,000 and £45,000 0.1019 0.97 0.0001 0.00 -0.1020 -0.76 
Income above £45,000 -0.0443 -0.26 0.0523 0.27 -0.0080 -0.04 
Less than 5 years driving experience 0.1935 1.04 0.0032 0.01 -0.1967 -0.84 
1.58 0.81 Between 5 and 10 years driving experience -0.0805 -0.52 -0.0713 -0.38 0.1518 0.80 
Over 10 years driving experience -0.1129 -0.84 0.0680 0.42 0.0449 0.27 
Annual mileage (1,000s) 0.0152 1.44 0.0141 1.19 -0.0294 -1.72 3.02 0.22 
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Table 5: Results for purchase models 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Log-likelihood (LL): -3,079.82 -3,555.92 -3,761.17 -3,655.43 -2,930.32 -3,094.16 
adj. Ρ
2
: 0.2185 0.0979 0.0690 0.0951 0.2162 0.1733 
P (buy): 70.34% 33.50% 52.33% 35.47% 23.72% 26.40% 
             
 est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat. 
Constant for buying 1.0400 13.38 -0.9460 -13.55 -0.6400 -10.16 -0.3380 -5.35 -1.5000 -11.68 -1.2600 -10.35 
Cost of mandatory system (£) -0.0027 -22.19 0.0009 9.66 - - - - - - - - 
Discount for mandatory system, price (£) - - - - 0.0003 16.41 -0.0001 -8.31 0.0002 5.38 -0.00001 -0.33 
Discount for mandatory system, tax (£) - - - - - - - - 0.0003 2.1 0.0002 1.41 
Cost of voluntary system (£) 0.0012 8.89 -0.0003 -3.08 0.0005 5.73 -0.0007 -6.89 - - - - 
Discount for voluntary system, price (£) - - - - - - - - -0.0003 -3.99 0.0004 7.02 
Discount for voluntary system, tax (£) - - - - - - - - -0.0005 -0.91 -0.0001 -0.2 
Fuel rebate for voluntary system (pence/mile) -0.3140 -6.77 0.2320 5.25 -0.2280 -5.35 0.3580 8.37 -0.0642 -1.1 0.0014 0.03 
Insurance cash back for voluntary system (pence/mile) -0.1190 -2.6 0.2800 6.64 -0.2690 -6.66 0.3820 9.32 0.0071 0.12 0.0871 1.56 
Free safety add-on - - - - - - - - 0.2620 3.22 - - 
Free styling add-on - - - - - - - - 0.3530 3.38 - - 
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 The ISA systems were referred to as permanent (mandatory) and opt-out (voluntary) speed limiters to 
ease understanding and avoid confusion with mandatory fitment.   
SCENARIO  25 PERMANENT OPT-OUT 
Vehicle purchase price 
discount 
£3500  £1000  
Incentive to use:  Cashback 
on your insurance 
no incentive 
For every mile the speed 
limiter is switched on earn 1p 
(max £200 per year for 20,000 
miles) 
Penalty for speeding 6 points 6 points 
% of other equipped vehicles 
on road 
40% equipped  
(60% not equipped) 
40% equipped 
 (60% not equipped) 
